As a near-universal political commitment to prevent or address atrocities the Responsibility to Protect supports the idea of common humanity, even though the operationalization of the principle is uneven and controversial. However, the RtoP agenda has become problematized by the political frictions of the shifting international order. This is reflected in normative contestation between liberal states and those -including rising or resurgent powerswhich promote a more conservative, pluralist vision of international society and which increasingly resist Western control of the political agenda. The transitional international order has also generated geopolitical tensions which -even if unconnected to humanitarian norms -obstruct the RtoP agenda. This article explores these themes and considers if RtoP, as an expression of common humanity, can achieve progress in this context.
2 rights treaties. In recent decades the apparent greater attention to a human-focussed international security agenda and to the protection of civilians in peril has further strengthened this movement. The Responsibility to Protect is a significant landmark in this. However, controversies associated with the application of RtoP highlight fundamental disagreements regarding how egregious human rights abuses should be addressed within a sovereign state system, and the relationship between individual justice and international order within a transitional international system. These controversies also reflect broader geopolitical rivalries as the relative influence and power of states shift. This paper will argue that, after ten years, the principle of RtoP does not yet reflect a common humanity, but rather a contingent political process involving the renegotiation of state sovereignty around a contested vision of individual security. A changing international order is not inevitably an obstacle to progress for the RtoP agenda or to the emergence of a common humanity. However, RtoP has become embroiled in normative contestations and geopolitical rivalries which are, at the very least, complicating the agenda. This paper will first explore the significance of RtoP in international politics before considering how the controversies related to the principle can be understood within the normative contestation of this transitional international order. It concludes by suggesting that RtoP must be disentangled from these broader dynamics, however difficult this will be.
RtoP and the common humanity
Academic debates have given great attention to whether RtoP constitutes an emerging norm, and more broadly if it reflects, or is even driving, a shift towards a more 3 humane world. The background to this is the history of progress in achieving international human rights agreements that are codified in the core human rights treaties and declarations, in addition to many more global and regional human rights instruments. In recent decades the apparent greater attention to a human-focussed international security agenda and to the protection of the needs and rights of individuals in peril has further strengthened the vision of a common humanity both in political theory and in policy circles. The extent and scope -and how to measureprogress in international human rights protection is controversial, but the idea of progress has support (Teitel, 2011) .
The Responsibility to Protect is a significant landmark in this movement and the 2005 agreement is itself an expression of common humanity. The principle commits states not only to the protection of their own populations -something already deeply embedded in international human rights law -but also to the populations of other states, most importantly through international assistance or action when states are manifestly failing to provide protection. This extends the concept of humanity further into the international realm, and it arguably reorients the relationship between individual justice and international order. If it is possible to give value to a declaratory political principle irrespective of its actual application, then RtoP does have significance as an expression of common humanity.
This question runs in parallel to the debate about whether RtoP is an international norm -a shared expectation of appropriate behaviour -or emerging norm. The declaratory proscription of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and agreement that the UN Security Council may respond to such crimes if states are manifestly failing to do so, has effectively universal support.
As a principle endorsed by the international community, therefore, this may be seen 4 as a norm, even if the operationalization of the principle is uneven and contested. A different, and more demanding, definition of a norm places more emphasis upon the practice of states in upholding and implementing principles and commitments, in a variety of different circumstances. It also requires a level of consistency that is not explained solely by the contingent interests of powerful states. This paper suggests that this more demanding definition of a norm should be applied when evaluating RtoP, and for considering if RtoP is relevant to the concept of a common humanity. The level of state commitment should be as strong, at least, as state support for major international human rights instruments (even though RtoP is a political and not a legal concept) because RtoP expressly deals with the most egregious human rights abuses which are, in theory, universally proscribed. For RtoP to be a meaningful measure of common humanity it would need to reflect a shared understanding amongst states about appropriate behavior and a demonstrable commitment to act collectively to prevent or address proscribed activities. Only this would constitute what Linklater (2007) describes as a 'commitment to cosmopolitan obligations'.
In turn, 'responsibilities' are things for which actors can be held accountable (Clark and Reus-Smit, 2013) . A declaratory commitment amongst states -even a near universal one -to a RtoP is not in itself a demonstration of common humanity, since this is not binding and operationalization is contingent upon interests and circumstances. From this perspective there is a great deal of scepticism about the value of RtoP in practical terms (Hehir, 2010) . Most obviously, the value of RtoP is challenged as a result of the widespread and ongoing occurrence of atrocities, which exposes the unwillingness of states to fulfil their commitment both to protect people within their own societies and to come to the aid, as an international society, of 5 populations elsewhere when governments are manifestly failing to prevent or address terrible human rights abuses.
Nevertheless, there are indications that the proscription of atrocities is gaining ground and has significance in international politics. As Bellamy (2013) has shown, when RtoP has been invoked it has increased the likelihood that calls for international action will be made in response to atrocities, making it almost routine that the UN Security Council will be involved in the protection of populations. He further suggests that RtoP increases the likelihood that calls for action will be translated into action.
According to this, RtoP is making a positive impact, despite the notable cases -such as Syria -where atrocities occur despite the commitment of the international community to address them. After 10 years RtoP, as controversial as it is, remains on the international agenda and it directly or indirectly helps to draw attention to the worst cases of human rights abuse -some of which will receive international action.
It may be overly generous to describe this as a demonstration of common humanity, but it is progress. The counterpoint to this claim is that the hard cases such as Syria define the value of a commitment to prevent or address atrocities, and so it is natural to ask what is the value of RtoP if it can offer no relief to the innocent victims of abuse in these cases. Surely a common humanity should offer some respite to those suffering the most egregious suffering. Moreover, when RtoP has seemingly been implemented -such as Libya -the results, from a human rights perspective, have been highly questionable in the longer term (UN, 2014) .
Most analysis explains the fluctuating fortunes of RtoP with reference to political will, the interests of great powers, and the specific circumstances of different cases in which RtoP might be relevant. In contrast, the rest of this paper will consider if the changing international order is relevant to understanding the controversies and 6 obstacles to progress in operationalizing RtoP, and whether growing normative contestation and geostrategic rivalry defies the concept of a common humanity.
Transitional international order
The relationship between international order (and changes in this order) and RtoP should not be taken as a given, because the idea of an international order is itself debatable. International order is generally related to the distribution and balance of hard and soft power, and the institutions and norms that regulate international politics: the accepted rules of international society, reflected in the behaviour of states and other actors (Hurrell, 2007) . From a more constructivist perspective international order and polarity are not necessarily a reflection of material power, but also expectations of behaviour, based upon experience and perception. Power -even preeminent power -does not always translate into the ability to achieve objectives, or to attract and lead followers (Buzan, 2008; Acharya, 2014) . The idea of international order and polarity -as something we can objectively define and characterise with reference to material power -is, from this perspective, problematic. International order is, therefore, to some extent a subjective construction, based upon expectations of behaviour and perceptions of capability, where the relationship between material power and outcomes is not a mechanical one. The norms and institutions that constitute international order -underpinned by the behaviour of states, legal principles, regimes, and the exercise of power -reflect these changes in multifaceted ways. The relative rise in power of a number of non-
Western states -such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa, amongst othershas arguably resulted in a process of normative contestation and resistance in international politics. Rising powers are not necessarily willing to be socialised into existing global institutions as passive 'norm takers', and various forms of normative resistance can be seen in a range of international policy areas. Connected to this, the manner in which decisions are taken and implemented in the application of international norms is also increasingly fractious. As a result, a major debate in international relations has explored whether the liberal international order is coming to an end (Buzan and Cox, 2013; Singh, 2008; Ikenberry, 2011; Kupchan, 2012) . It is much less clear if the rising powers are able or wish to collectively support a coherent alternative normative worldview (Lieber, 2014; Laïdi, 2012) that democratic states constitute a legitimate community for the purposes of coercive humanitarian action -even without Security Council authorization -reinforces this sense of normative dissonance (Geis, 2013) . In this context a range of controversies remain in terms of the definition, scope and application of RtoP, and many of these naturally relate to reacting to atrocities. In particular, a number of influential nonWestern states have expressed concern about the manner in which the RtoP agenda has been dominated by liberal, Western centres of power. This represents a severe constraint to the prospects of RtoP as an expression of common humanity.
The concerns of China, India, Russia, South Africa, Brazil, amongst others, about how RtoP is defined and implemented reflect tensions about the legitimacy and authority of norm diffusion, collective decision-making and international institutions.
Changes in the balance of power have implications for the diffusion of norms, including RtoP, as rising powers are increasingly assertive and resistant to ideas with which they do not identify and to the manner in which these ideas are promoted. In this sense, resistance amongst rising powers to RtoP is a manifestation of a broader resistance to the manner in which power is exercised in international relations.
Controversies related to RtoP point to world order tensions that have always existed but which are more pronounced today as non-Western powers rise in power and influence. Pu (2012: 365) has suggested that in the coming decades 'emerging powers will change the distribution of material power and also challenge the Western domination of ideas and norms in international society.' Some of the controversy surrounding RtoP can be seen as a manifestation of this contestation. In some ways this points to a tension between pluralist approaches to human rights -which are underpinned by a Westphalian, statist worldview, and an emphasis upon non-interference -and a more liberal worldview which has a contingent view of sovereignty. According to the pluralist worldview a stable international society is, or should be, based upon mutual recognition and respect for territorial integrity, and non-interference into the domestic affairs of other states.
There is no clear distinction between a liberal west and a pluralist nonwestern world, and this is certainly not a simple north-south debate (Rotmann et al, 2014) . Indeed, the US has reservations about RtoP because it does not wish to be committed to unforeseen circumstances and it wishes to approach humanitarian issues on a case-by-case basis. However, the declaratory language that it uses is unmistakably liberal and often interventionist in tone, whether or not it wishes to be involved in intervention. In contrast, the pluralist reservations about RtoP have more commonly been heard in non-Western capitals, and this also reflects a pattern of behavior that suggests a broader normative contestation and not only geopolitical rivalry.
The pluralist emphasis upon non-intervention is sometimes expressed as an extension of communitarian political culture -for example, in the case of China and other Asian countries (Pang, 2009; Morada, 2009 ) -or as a result of historical experience, for example in Africa (Williams, 2009) where sovereign statehood was often hard-earned. According to the pluralist perspective, there can be a tension between order and individual justice, but an international system which permits coercion or intervention on a discretionary, selective basis, even when wellintentioned, would undermine international order (Bull, 1984: 13 ). An extension of this thinking is that involvement -especially military involvement -rarely improves the situation for victims of human rights abuse and can easily make the situation worse by exacerbating conflict. Moreover, within the pluralist worldview there is no basis for making judgements about the legitimacy of national governments in relation to domestic issues, apart from in the most exceptional circumstances.
In contrast, many states which have been promoting RtoP -or coercive humanitarianism -have also been associated with a broader assertive liberal internationalism geared towards the promotion of democracy and market economics, and the containment of 'rogue' states (Elden, 2007; Blair, 2009; Moses, 2010) .
Therefore, despite attempts to define the principle narrowly, controversy surrounding
RtoP can be explained in part by its association with this broader liberal agenda.
From this perspective the challenge of RtoP is not -as is commonly believed -just that of political will, but rather conflicting worldviews. Whilst there has never been consensus on the relationship between individual justice and international order
RtoP exposes important tensions because it comes at a time when attitudes towards sovereignty and human rights are evolving, and when the distribution of political power is in transition. This relates not only to human rights but also to the nature of the international system. If RtoP is seen as an emerging assertive solidarism in international society -a 'paradigm shift' from the Westphalian notion of noninterference towards non-indifference (Dash, 2012: 7) -then it appears to be coming up against powerful rising powers that do not subscribe to this worldview. It is resisted not only for pragmatic self-interested reasons -although these are obviously very important -but also because some states subscribe to a more pluralist conception of international society.
It follows that the idea of a fundamental change in the nature of sovereignty - implying that externally-driven regime change was illegitimate (Churkin, 2013) .
Therefore, the sovereign government deserves the assumption of legitimacy; or at least if that legitimacy is to be challenged, that must come from domestic -not external -actors. China similarly explained its position in relation to Syria's 20 sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and the 'responsible protection' treatise clearly fits into this worldview -including the assumption of state legitimacy (Zongze, 2012) . The pluralist worldview is certainly shared by a much larger number of states -including India (Dash 2012 ) -even though in the case of Syria they did not wish to appear in support of Assad.
The position of Russia and China on Syria is an extreme example of this broader tension in international relations related to international order which forms a fundamental challenge to common humanity as a political agenda. RtoP has become embroiled within, and to some extent emblematic of, this broader normative conflict.
In this context there is a tension between established, often liberal, powers -such as the US and West European states, and their allies in various parts of the world -and the rising and increasingly assertive powers of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and others, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and some Latin American countries.
Other non-Western groupings such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum also reflect this normative contestation.
A number of processes are involved here. Rising or resurgent powers are resistant to the idea of being socialized as norm-takers, even if they do not represent a unified or coherent alternative vision. There is a wariness towards -or even resistance to -liberal ideas of world order amongst this group, and an emphasis upon sovereignty, non-interference and other pluralist values in a world that, at least in normative terms, is increasingly multipolar. There is fundamental disagreement in terms of how egregious human rights abuses might be addressed within a sovereign state system, and these disagreements reflect shifting power dynamics and thus changing international order. promoted -reflects broader dynamics of power in the international system that are shifting as the relative influence of states shifts.
Attempts to relate the politics of RtoP to the changing international order have generally portrayed international order as a normative construction, within which different states -whether rising or falling -represent and promote a certain worldview that has relevance to RtoP (Newman, 2013) . However, a further important way in which the changing international order is relevant to RtoP is less related to norms and more a reflection of geopolitical rivalry and power politics. According to this interpretation, rising powers resist aspects of RtoP because it is seen -however outlandish this perception is for supporters of the principle -as a Western political movement, and worst still as a means of legitimizing Western hegemony, in parallel with broader patterns of domination. A shifting power balance facilitates resistance to this as states rise in relative power and alliances evolve, reflecting patterns of geopolitical rivalry found across a range of issue areas. From this perspective the transitional international order is essentially not really about norms, rather it is about shifting power and the conflicting interests that this generates. As a result, RtoP is controversial and sometimes contested because it is seen as a principle that has been championed by Western states. Accordingly there is no grand normative contestation but rather rising powers resist and challenge the Western control of the RtoP agenda.
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Conclusion
The RtoP principle has undoubtedly achieved progress in broader perspective, even amongst conservative states, and despite the controversies of recent years. India, China and Brazil have softened their position and moved from firm resistance around the launch of the ICISS report to guarded support in principle since 2005 (Liu and Zhang, 2014; Stuenkel and Tourinho, 2014; Jaganathan and Kurtz, 2014) . Brazil has clearly sought to take a leadership role not in outrightly resisting RtoP but by seeking to make it more accountable and sensitive to concerns relating to sovereignty, intervention and the exercise of power. Historically, China has been implacably resistant to any international incursion -whether coercive or not -into 'domestic' matters, and yet it has given endorsements of RtoP since 2005, and supported -or at least not vetoed -a number of UN decisions related to RtoP (Teitt, 2009 ). However, without denying this progress, as the pace of RtoP has accelerated and as it has been applied to sensitive cases the underlying resistance within these and other states has become apparent in the form of a backlash against substantial parts of the RtoP agenda -or the perception of the agenda. In this context, some of the support that has emerged in countries such as China, Brazil, India and South Africa has evaporated since the Libya experience of 2011. Moreover, this resistance can be interpreted in part as a defence of Westphalian norms against what is seen -rightly or wrongly -as the Western, liberal dominance of RtoP. This has negative implications for RtoP as an expression of common humanity because it makes it difficult to imagine political consensus amongst major states in support of the principle.
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The principle of RtoP has become entangled with broader controversies and debates related to the evolution of state sovereignty, the balance between international order and individual justice, and the legitimacy of international norms in a changing international system. In this context, the question of how international actors should respond to egregious human rights abuses, either individually or collectively, is controversial, even if RtoP relates to a narrow range of atrocities that are already universally proscribed in principle. There is a broader normative contestation -and perhaps a 'moral crisis of liberal internationalism' (Burke, 2005: 86) -within which RtoP has, perhaps unfairly, been tied. Moreover, the transitional international order is not entirely a normative contest; RtoP has also become embroiled in geopolitical rivalries that are the consequence of shifting power dynamics.
A changing international order is not necessarily an obstacle for progress on the RtoP agenda or for the idea of common humanity. States in relationships defined by shifting power and influence -or even adversity -can share a commitment to new norms and principles, including those which seek to prevent and address mass atrocities. The challenge is to dissociate RtoP from these broader processes, but that is a formidable task. The 'RtoP' label may have become a part of the problem since it incites normative and geopolitical contestation which is not helpful for the humanitarian agenda. RtoP does, after ten years, have political traction in international politics -despite the tragic cases of human rights abuse which seem to make a mockery of the principle -and it seems sensible to build upon this rather than abandon it. However, the tenth anniversary seems a good opportunity to revisit the principle both in academic and policy circles to consider how to give it renewed momentum, and issues related to the transitional international order need to be at the heart of this. At present the RtoP discourse has become politically divisive; a new 25 political initiative is necessary to address the normative and political sensitivities which exist, and this must reflect the shifting power dynamics which are likely to define the future international order. As a part of this, it is essential for RtoP to be consciously and explicitly separated from some aspects of the broader international liberal agenda, and for debates about RtoP to be related to the exercise and accountability of power. It is also necessary for leading UN members to agree to separate the response to egregious human rights abuse from their broader geopolitical rivalries, however difficult this will be.
